TOWARDS GLOBAL GOVERNMENT: REALITY OR
OXYMORON?
Valerie Epps*
The title of this panel asks us to examine where the world is going
and what is likely to be the governance structure for the foreseeable future.
This is a somewhat forbidding topic, but certainly worth tackling. We want
to ask ourselves whether the various forces in the world currently
operative will be reformulated, and if so, what the global arrangement will
look like. Several models spring to mind, and I thought I would outline a
few of them in order to get the debate going. I should add that I will not
offer a critique of these models, otherwise I will have far outrun my
prerogative as chair, but I hope that each model will arouse its critics and
possibly suggest other models.
The models I will suggest can be listed as follows:
(1) The "ethnic solidarity" model.
(2) The "clash of civilizations" model.
(3) The "urge to modernize, ruled by the multi-national
corporation" model.
(4) The "world civilization caused by economic
development" model, which is somewhat similar to
the "urge to modernize" model.
(5) The "substantive-issues-dictate-the-structure" model.
(6) A brief mention of a "world governmental" model
and the "rapid growth in regional international
structures" model.
One scenario is what we might call the Ethnic Solidarity Model.
Forget state sovereignty. States are gone - the future lies in much smaller
ethnic groups. The drive towards a comfortable, non-complex sense of
self, of family, clan, and tribe will drive us towards smaller units. This
movement partially reveals itself in all the groups that yearn for some sort
of autonomy and who seek to remove themselves from alien dominant
cultures - the Tamils, the Kurds, the Kashmiris, the Scots, and the
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Quebecoise. It also manifests itself in new configurations of nationalism,
often based on ethnic lines. The former Chezolovakia splits into two
republics. Yugoslavia is replaced by five republics, arranged largely along
ethnic lines, which are currently engaged in a battle to the death in
rearranging their borders through the means of ethnic cleansing. This
model sees a hunkering down towards one's ethnic or cultural center and
an insistent demand not to be dominated or ruled by an alien, ethnic group.
In a way it is a modem form of anti-colonialism now renamed self-determinism.
Within states that are not facing issues of secession, the same
model is often manifested in a fervent nationalism and anti-immigrant
movement. Certain elements in the U.S. currently represent this theme.
There are bills in Congress to reduce substantially the number of legal
immigrants to the U.S., and also to increase substantially efforts to keep
out or deport illegal immigrants. Several countries in the European Union
have experienced similar trends, such as the burning of Turkish workers in
Germany and the frequent attacks on North Africans in France. The
Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights recently
issued a depressing report on racism and xenophobia which documents
these trends.,
This model, the ethnic solidarity model, almost always rejects any
form of outside governance and often sees such structures as sophisticated
attempts at dominating the group's culture. Structures like the U.N. are
viewed at best, as ineffective or irrelevant, and at worst, as a conspiracy to
keep certain powerful groups in control of not only the supranational
structure itself, but also their domination of the economic and resource
allocation systems.
Another model, explored extensively by Professor Samuel
Huntington, is the Clash of Civilizations model. Although Huntington
recognizes "the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism" 2 he is
convinced that we are entering the age of clashes of civilizations which he
defines as
"Western,
Confucian,
Japanese, Islamic,
Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. ... "I
The day of the nation state which was characterized by ideological
wars is over, and we are moving towards eruptions based on the "fault
lines between civilizations. "4 The micro-level clash will occur between
1. Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 103, U.N. Doc. A/50/476 (1995).
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different civilizations struggling over control of territory and the
macro-level clash will occur as these civilizations "compete for relative
military and economic power . . . control of international institutions...
and competitively promote their particular political and religious values."'
At the moment, Huntington concludes that "[tihe West in effect is
using international institutions, military power and economic resources to
run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect
6
Western interests and promote Western political and economic values,"
He has outlined a strategy that will keep the West dominant but he finally
recognizes that the West will "have to accommodate . . . non-Western
civilizations" and will have to make an "effort to identify elements of
commonality between Western and other civilizations." The prediction is
that there will be "no universal civilization" but rather "a world of
different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the
others." 7 While this last remark might be seen as at least a step towards a
vision of a "multi-ethnic" global society, it is clear that the whole tenor of
this model is deeply pessimistic towards such a view. The vision of the
future is driven by notions of power scrambles based on clashes between
ingrained cultural divisions. I doubt that this model believes in any sort of
altruism operating at anything other than a personal level, and it clearly
perceives such movements as, for example, the human rights movement,
primarily an effort to foist Western values onto non-western societies.
Huntington is clearly a cultural relativist, but he understands what steps are
necessary to keep a particular culture in the ascendancy, and what factors
may lead to the unraveling of that ascendancy. It is the rise and future
dominance of non-western cultures that creates this vision and gives its
people nightmares. The model foresees the ascendancy of Islamic and
Hindu fundamentalism taking over the secular states of India, Pakistan,
Turkey, Iran, Algeria and so on. Japan is the enigma because it has
become a modern state without becoming a Western state. The model
clearly identifies modernity (whatever that may entail) with Westernism. I
suppose by modernity is meant things like banking systems, sophisticated
transportation and communications systems, heated or cooled and
adequately plumbed houses and offices, universal modern health care and
education. It is unclear whether the model thinks that non-western
civilizations will achieve these conveniences without becoming
westernized.
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This view might well leave the nation state nominally intact rather
like a modern constitutional monarch, but in reality the state becomes only
a cipher in a much greater force of what is called a civilization. The
current supra-national structure might well undergo further development
but only if one civilization gains dominance and then the development will
occur in order to enhance that particular civilization.
This view of the future has been elegantly challenged by Professor
Fouad Ajami who views the rise of fundamentalism as "less a sign of
resurgence [of civilization] than of panic and bewilderment . . . ." His
model of the world sees it as driven by the quest to "move out of
poverty," to seek "Sony, not soil" 9 and to "scramble for . . . market
shares" not to "set out on expeditions of principle." "Politics and
ideology" is mostly "sublimated into finance . . . "1' The whole idea of
civilizational hegemony is trounced by far too many cross cultural threads
and far too many divisions and conflicts within so-called civilizations.
Under this view "civilizations do not control states, states control
civilizations"." States will continue to be the main actors and they will act
out of self-interest in modernizational (consumerist) not civilizational
solidarity.
This view, even if based on a fairly cynical view of humans, finds
the urge to modernize so great that this alone will probably produce
supra-national structures. International business organizations will
probably predominate within the state and inter-state structures and the
current concerns of the United Nations in peacekeeping or humanitarian
work will only be supported if those activities contribute towards reducing
poverty, increasing modernization, and providing more goods to the main
actors. This model does not seem to concern itself with the configuration
of the distribution of wealth but remains in the thrall of those institutions
that deliver the goods - primarily great business enterprises.
Another model suggested by Robert Bartley of the Wall Street
Journal raises the prospect of a world civilization driven by world-wide
instant communications, "economic interdependence and the appeal of
individual freedom . . . . " 12 and "its political appendages of democracy..
."
This model finds support for its view in such factors as the West
8.
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having won the cold war; reports that the number of "free" nations has
risen by thirty percent in the last decade; and information that as soon as
per capita income in a county rises above $5,500 nearly all states become
democratic with a few exceptions such as some oil sheikdoms and some of
the Asian Tigers. Under this view, economic development, which creates
a middle class, leads inexorably to enough people wanting a say in their
own future - which spells democracy. At the moment China remains the
enigma in this model - relentlessly improving its economy without trailing
clouds of participatory government-although Hong Kong should certainly
present a crucible for the theory once it joins China in 1997.
This model notes that democracies seldom go to war with each
other (although it sometimes forgets that civil wars, which can certainly be
as bloody as international wars, do not necessarily decline and that the two
World Wars defy this maxim). The optimistic view of this model sees the
whole world moving towards individual freedom (note the Western value)
and economic prosperity. Presumably supra-national structures will be
changed or fashioned to promote these values. It is again a model that
does not challenge the supremacy of the nation-state, but sees the
nation-state as necessarily moving towards the Western democratic model
and trailing supra-national structures in its wake, provided they also
support this trend.
The final model that certainly deserves at least brief mention, is
what I shall call the "substantive-issues-dictate-the-structure" model. This
model moves from somewhat different premises. It suggests that the
human condition constantly finds itself confronted with problems and that
it is these problems that dictate the structure of the form of governance.
For example, modern industrialization has led to pollution. The problem
of pollution has to be solved. The existing nation-state/domestic law
system could not solve some of the major aspects of the problem (such as
ozone depletion) because pollution does not respect state sovereignty. As a
result, a comprehensive international treaty system with, at the moment, an
embryonic, but growing supra-national enforcement system became
necessary. In other words the substance of the problem necessitated a
supra-national solution.
This type of model posits that the nature of the problem dictates
the level at which it can be solved. This may be the national, state or local
level depending on the problem, but the model often predicts that the vast
increase in the international movement of goods and people will likely
necessitate supra-national structures that will arise and develop out of the
particular issues that present themselves. This model is probably one of the
most optimistic with respect to predicting the development and growth of
supra-national organizations and it is probably the least concerned about
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domination of the supra-national structures by particular blocs. The
supra-national structure, however, may be much less governmental, in the
traditional sense, and rather more problem solving oriented.
None of the above models embraces a thorough abolition of the
nation state and the creation of a world government in which we would all
simply be world citizens, yet that too is a model some may wish to discuss.
None of these models pays particular attention to the rise of regional
international structures, which is certainly a model that some predict will
characterize the next century - the European Union, being in the vanguard
of this movement. None of these models start from a vision of a
supra-national structure and from that structure predicts the shape of
smaller units. Rather, all of these models look at the present nation-state
structure and from that, attempt to predict possible supra-national
structures. Let me end where I began by posing the question of what the
structure of the world is going to look like for the foreseeable future and
by hoping that some of the models outlined will spark a lively response.

